paradox of nuclear deterrence

"Nobody has been able to demonstrate the utility of nuclear weapons for compellence as opposed to deterrence," said Daniel Pinkston, a US Air Force veteran and a professor of international relations at the Seoul-based Troy University. These paradoxes are presented in the form of statements that ap- pear absurd or incredible on first inspection, but can be supported by quite convincing arguments. A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. Pakistan and India, two nuclear neighbors as in South Asia with a hostile historical legacy, have limited strategic options to pursue in an Nuclear deterrence was but one factor that contributed to the eventual outcome. 18 At the heart of all these permutations of nuclear deterrence is that nuclear weapons will either deny an aggressor their objective, or will . There is no bigger blunderbuss than a nuclear weapon atop a long-range missile. The basic paradox of nuclear deterrence is that weapons too dangerous to use in war are threatened in order to prevent war.1 The credibility of nuclear threats is a function of many things including the capability to inflict harm on the target, the political willingness to run risks of nuclear war, and the clear communication of ability and . Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. States seeking to avoid nuclear warfare must therefore make a credible commitment to use them; if such a commitment cannot be made, then other states will not be afraid of attacking. Smaller-yield message-senders have been created in the form of tactical nuclear weapons, but any … Discriminate Deterrence Read More » The paradox is that the fewer weapons each side has the greater the danger . The Paradox of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of Global Nuclear Disarmament Masako Ikegami Professor of political science, Stockholm University "Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a contemporary deterrence strategy in nuclear and non-nuclear technologies is an omnipresent interest to the developing . Assured destruction keeps the peace through the fundamental paradox of nuclear strategic deterrence: a strategy well established as the Pentagon seeking to launch a new fleet of high-tech, heavily . As posited by western deterrence theorists, offsetting nuclear capabilities and secure, second-strike capabilities would induce special caution, providing the basis for war prevention and escalation control. DOI link for The Paradox of Deterrence. Footnote 9 Deterrence is therefore based on the psychological principle of a threat of retaliation. A little more than halfway through their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, the U.S. bishops acknowledge voices calling on them "to raise a prophetic challenge to the community of faith—a challenge which goes beyond nuclear deterrence.". Discriminate Deterrence. We have guided missiles and misguided men." Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and conflict. The great paradox of the nuclear age is that deterrence of nuclear war is sought by building ever more lethal and precise weapons. Paradox of deterrence: India-Pakistan strategic relations Zafar Nawaz Jaspal * Nuclear weapons have transformed military power into a very expensive and dangerous tool of statecraft; it should not be exercised without a great deal of wisdom. Consequently, while big wars get less likely, the stability-instability paradox means that nuclear deterrence makes smaller conflicts more likely because great (nuclear) powers need no longer fear that any small conflict they start will draw in an opposing great (nuclear) power. The Paradox of Deterrence . 1. This chapter finds significant evidence that the normative taboo-based theories provide superior explanations to behavior exhibited during the Korean War than do the alternative lens theories. Yet it is a difficult one to due to the speculative nature of deterrence theory and nuclear weapons. In his "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence . The Paradoxes of Deterrence. There is no bigger blunderbuss than a nuclear weapon atop a long-range missile. Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan Strategic Relations‪.‬ . Hence, nuclear weapons challenge the Clausewitzian view of war as an instrument of politics. Given the human and political carnage associated with the Great War, it was natural for historians, military strategists, policy analysts, diplomats, and politicians to try to understand why the breakdown occurred. The stability-instability paradox was embedded in the enormity of the stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold. It remains difficult to predict what direction Israel's nuclear doctrine and policy will take over the next decade. This volume examines the complex and vitally important ethical questions connected with the deployment of nuclear weapons and their use as a deterrent. The Paradox of Deterrence book Home Technology Stability-Instability Paradox Stability-Instability Paradox. Such actions may be necessary to legitimize deterrence-to make it credible for the future. Zara Mansoor The newly published engrossing account about nuclear proliferation, arms race, stability-instability paradox and stable deterrent factor is worth a deal of reading. Commitment, in the form of renouncing or eliminating certain strategic possibilities ahead of time to gain an advantage, is one of the fundamental insights of game theory. Previous Chapter Next Chapter. Take, for example, how the 2008 Mumbai crisis played out. Nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security only in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It was the enduring need for deterrence that forced the Obama Administration to confront a paradox of nuclear strategy. In contrast, many nuclear proliferation experts use the stability-instability paradox to explain how regions with rival nuclear powers become increasingly unstable. The Paradox of Power In an era where the development of new technologies threatens to outstrip strategic doctrine, David Gompert and Phil Saunders offer a searching meditation on issues at the . While shifts can occur from the former to the latter or vice versa, the term 'nuclear power . India's cost-imposition strategies are skewed and unlikely to deter its rivals from continued sub-conventional provocations to territorial land grabs. nuclear deterrence, whereby owning nuclear weapons deters other nations with hostile interests from attacking in any way. Associated with this thesis is the concept of the "stability-instability paradox" (Snyder, 1965), whereby nuclear-armed states are secure in the deterrence of general nuclear war but are free to exploit military asymmetries (including strategic and tactical nuclear asymmetries as well as conventional military advantages) at lower levels of . This is the paradox at the heart of deterrence. Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons essentially . As British Defence Minister Denis Healey put it in the 1960s, one only needed five per cent credibility to deter the Russians, but 95 per cent to . GENRE. India's profound embarrassment should have, at least according to . Deterrence theory, among its many failings, doesn't take into account paradox and irony. Abstract. 1. Accordingly, deterrence between nuclear weapons states is considered to be relatively "stable". nuclear taboo theory and the nuclear taboo paradox, as well as two alternative lens theories— deterrence and the nuclear stability-instability paradox. a nuclear capability were to attack another with nuclear weapons, there would be sound reason for the attacked country, or even a third party, to retaliate. . Print PDF. For more than 70 years, scholars and policymakers have examined the role of nuclear weapons in trans-Atlantic relations. The Future of Deterrence: Keeping Nuclear Weapons Holstered Was the Easy Part. There is no bigger blunderbuss than a nuclear weapon atop a long-range missile. The idea of nuclear war became unimaginable almost overnight when the United States and Soviet Union tested the first hydrogen bombs in the early 1950s. ABSTRACT. Therein lies the paradox of nuclear deterrence: to never use them, use must be believable. The stability-instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction.It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. On the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence WILLIAM H. SHAW abstract Nuclear deterrence has struck many people as morally perplexing because it is a case in which it appears to be right to threaten, and in a sense intend, what it would be wrong to do. Some believe that nuclear deterrence creates stability by reducing the probability of a direct war between two powers, but it also leads to instability by increasing the probability of minor or indirect conflicts. Assured destruction keeps the peace through the fundamental paradox of nuclear strategic deterrence: a strategy well established as the Pentagon seeking to launch a new fleet of high-tech, heavily . Gregory S. Kavka. By Christian Ruhl, John Gans, and Michael C. Horowitz. The standard interpretation of the coming of World War I provided the intellectual foundation for . In Perry's case, that was his mission and he carried it out with imagination and extraordinary skill. However, there remains a blurred line in distinguishing between nuclear power and nuclear weapon. Podcasts - A Most Terrible Weapon. This literature review studies whether game theory can be applied to explain the absence of nuclear war and ifnuclear deterrence is a rational explanation for the nuclear Smaller-yield message-senders have been created in the form of tactical . analyze deterrence from a moral rather than a strategic perspective. One paradox of nuclear deterrence has always been that whatever utility the Bomb provides is lost once the nuclear threshold is crossed, however large or small the boom. Those prophetic voices rejected the position, embraced at that . One paradox of nuclear deterrence we may call the rationality paradox: While it is a rational policy to threaten nuclear retaliation against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, it would not be rational to carry out the retaliation should the threat fail to deter; and what would not be rational to do is not, in the circumstances . The stability-instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction.It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. November 4, 2020. CUP Archive, Oct 30, 1987 - Philosophy - 256 pages. The topic gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction, which models the . A potential Deterrence in the time of stability-instability paradox becomes weak and nearly down to the level of 'zero'. maintaining a nuclear arsenal that could withstand an attack with the capacity to retaliate increased national security in two ways: it could be used to deter a nuclear attack, and could be used to deter conventional aggression as well. Deterrence theory refers to scholarship and practice on how threats or limited force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. Pakistan - India Security Paradox: Between Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy 161 Pakistan - India Security Paradox: B etween Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy Dr. Maryam Azam. The Paradox of Deterrence . Keywords: North Korea, nuclear weapons, stability-instability paradox, deterrence, risk tolerance, South Korea, ROK-U.S. Alliance, nuclear proliferation Introduction On January 6, 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test claiming it had tested a hydrogen bomb. This argument, which borders on the tautological, was irrefutable before the scientists of the Manhattan Project developed the atomic bomb. The stability-instability paradox shows that to be effective, nuclear deterrence requires a measure of nuclear instability. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the nuclear realm, where being absolutely prepared to respond to a nuclear launch has ensured no such attack has happened. In other words, the aim of deterrence is to influence perceptions and the decision calculus of the opponent to prevent him o doing something undesired. These two proud countries have attempted to wean themselves from outside support by using nuclear . This how the paradox of nuclear deterrence is reached. Debates and considerations took place at moments of great tension and moments of great . Beijing is now trying to make its limited number of arms more survivable. One paradox of nuclear deterrence has always been that whatever utility the Bomb provides is lost once the nuclear threshold is crossed, however large or small the boom. nuclear deterrence, whereby owning nuclear weapons deters other nations with hostile interests from attacking in any way. One such theorist, Michael Krepon, argued in the mid-2000s how at . nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a In Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957) Kissinger asserted that "the major problem of a strategy in the nuclear age is how to establish a relationship between a policy of deterrence and a strategy for fighting a war in case deterrence fails." His solution then (since renounced) was to develop a tactical nuclear force capable of . In essence, India's and Pakistan's nuclear policies involve what might be called the "independence-dependence paradox.". Dixit, now the national Deterrence theory is oriented toward "more is better," but this doesn't ensure positive outcomes in dangerous crises. But, in the world that remained after a massive Soviet attack, it is unlikely The problem he faced was that the Soviet army was seen to have a three-to-one edge in conventional forces . The stability-instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the use and affect of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Despite all the theories, models and structures pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons, one can't actually proof that nuclear deterrence definitely works; it is "in a strict sense speculative" (Quinlan, 2009: 13). One paradox of nuclear deterrence has always been that whatever utility the Bomb provides is lost once the nuclear threshold is crossed, however large or small the boom. The Paradox of Commitment. It does not set out to examine the stability-instability paradox within the realm of cyber conflict but to integrate cyber conflict into the already existing logic of the paradox as it pertains to nuclear deterrence. The paradoxes of nuclear deterrence applied equally to India. Thus Indian Defence Forces must invest greater focus and energy on rebalancing its deterrence doctrine from punitive to denial strategies. of deterrence Deterrence is a parent of paradox. War is the epitome of the stability-instability paradox, which states that nuclear weapons simultaneously induce stability at the level of nuclear war and instability at lower intensity levels of conflict. Section 1 explores the assumptions that are necessary to generate this moral paradox. In fact, there are multiple unknowns. The basic concept of deterrence has been sliced in various ways for purposes ranging from deterrence denial to extended deterrence in order to discourage adversaries from coercing or attacking allies. Discriminate Deterrence. Whether nuclear overhang provides space for war, alludes to the oft-referred stability-instability paradox. nuclear weapons create stability and deterrence both at micro and macro levels when the adversaries possess matching capabilities that resultantly generate a corollary of a nuclear deterrence theory premised on Glenn Snyder‟s "stability-instability paradox."5 The realists agree that the states Since its initiation by the Prime Minister's Office in 2003, India's nuclear doctrine, for all official purposes, has revolved around the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence (CMD). The paradox of nuclear weapons is that they are too destructive to be used, so both sides are 'deterred' from doing so." --"On missile defense, the U.S. systems in the ground and on the drawing board are not aimed at Russia and never have been. By not authorizing retaliatory strikes, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh compounded the damage to India's deterrence posture - at least in terms of deterrence theory. Modern deterrence theories were conceived in the aftermath of World War I. DOI link for The Paradox of Deterrence. The realization that war is not a rational alternative to accomplishing political objectives had substantiated deterrence as a dominant concept of nuclear strategy since the beginning of the nuclear age in the military doctrines of nuclear weapon States. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. Yet policies of nuclear deterrence did not escape the fundamental paradox of nuclear weapons. Set against the real backdrop of nuclear expansion and modernization, the joint statement highlights a stark reality: nuclear weapon states are not on the same page as those who seek vast reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. The Paradox of Deterrence book The paradox of nuclear power in international relationsSince 1945, nuclear technology has continued to play a vital role in giving strategic momentum and dynamism to the game of international diplomacy. With nuclear weapons, strategy has become an instrument to prevent war; the That germinated a realization in the nuclear-capable adversaries‟ military establishments tha t their chief purpose was to avert nuclear wars instead of . Indian Military Strategy And Deterrence Paradox. For instance, a nation wants to prevent nuclear first strikes or cyber-attacks and a company . This paper builds on Jervis's work in his essay "Kargil, Deterrence, and International Relations Theory" by fur- This literature review studies whether game theory can be applied to explain the absence of nuclear war and ifnuclear deterrence is a rational explanation for the nuclear In fact, it could be argued that the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly depends on U.S. intervention. Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The invasion of Ukraine could be seen as an example of the stability-instability paradox: because the threat of a nuclear war is too terrible to contemplate, smaller or proxy conflicts become . Introduction: Emerging Challenges to Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence. Without them, deterrence fuels an endless arms race, while any serious crisis between the great powers will bring them to the brink of nuclear war. The stability-instability paradox posits that two nuclear-armed, adversarial states, believing that neither will initiate a nuclear strike, can and will increasingly engage in . Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence by Gregory S. Kavka, 9780521338967, available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide. No tactical nuclear weapon has yet been used in war. Pakistan - India Security Paradox: Between Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy Pakistan - India Security Paradox: Between Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy Dr. Maryam Azam 1 Abstract Pakistan and India, as two nuclear neighbors in South Asia with a hostile historical legacy, have limited strategic options to pursue in an environment where uncertainty and threat are constant. Smaller-yield message-senders have been created in the form of tactical . The Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence: Away from Strategic Thinking, Back to the Sacred A pacifist would say that surely the best way for humanity to avoid a nuclear war is not to have any nuclear weapons. For a state with the ambition to re-emerge as a great power, China has invested remarkably little in nuclear weapons, to a degree even that its current minimal deterrence capacity is questioned. India's Arms Accumulation and Deterrence The huge military of India is built on the pretext of China; India wants to counter China in the region. It argues that when two countries possess nuclear weapons it decreases the chance of direct war between the two powers, but the possibility of minor conflicts or proxy wars increases (Krepon, 2005). 4 THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX, MISPERCEPTION, AND ESCALATION CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA endowed with nuclear power…while conflict has been the order of the day in the developing, non-nuclear Third World."10 The ranks of deterrence optimists include J.N. To understand this paradox, and to prepare the way for my main subject, namely the paradoxes of deterrence as they arise from the world's present desperate situation of nuclear deterrence, one must first examine the nature of threats in general. Nuclear deterrence is the threat of nuclear attack as retaliation, to prevent the opponent from using violence against the vital interests of the one who deters. Cold Start planning failed - and failed spectacularly — to deter the Mumbai attacks. Unlike decision problems, where more options can never leave one worse off> In interactive problems, games, where reactions come, not from nature . By contrast, extending one's national nuclear deterrence to allies is much more complicated. Kissinger, Schultz, Perry, and Nunn wrote, "…continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is encouraging, or at least excusing, the spread of these weapons, and will inevitably erode the essential cooperation necessary to avoid proliferation, protect nuclear materials and deal effectively with new threats . As Cohen summarizes: "threatening to do what would serve no political purpose [launch a war of mutually . 0 Reviews. The decision of the Ben-Gurion-led Government to develop a nuclear option was certainly one of the most daring and far-sighted initiatives of the early years of Israel's establishment. The second limitation of the extant theory on cyber conflict and the stability-instability paradox is a methodological one. The readier you are to respond, the less you have to. Consider a typical situation involving deterrence. A number of the essays contained here have already established themselves . 20th May 2020 Arsim Tariq Technology, Emerging Technologies, Military, Nuclear, Security 15. If the nuclear realm were entirely stable, the likelihood of nuclear use would be zero, states' nuclear deterrent threats would be wholly incredible and cost free, and other states would ignore them. By Zara Mansoor - The book "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia"is authored by Devin T. Hagerty, professor of political science at the university of Maryland. The deterrence theory academics eventually started applying the stability-instability paradox to the India-Pakistan equation, and rightly so, given both are nuclear weapons states with an ongoing dispute over Kashmir, and their geographical proximity only adds to the instability. But for President Dwight Eisenhower, preventing nuclear war meant convincing everyone that you weren't afraid to fight one. In this book, Thérèse Delpech calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of the traditional concepts of first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers (e.g., China), smaller . Conflict theorists, notably Thomas Schelling, have pointed out several paradoxes of deter­ rence: that it may be to the advantage of someone who is trying to deter another to be irrational, to have fewer available options, or to lack relevant information. 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